Motions in Limine by Davis, Tom H.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
1966
Motions in Limine
Tom H. Davis
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Evidence Commons, and the Torts Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Tom H. Davis, Motions in Limine, 15 Clev.-Marshall L. Rev. 255 (1966)
Motions in Limine
Tom H. Davis*
A DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY in a tort or personal injury case can
fumble, stumble and fall-and win. A plaintiff's attorney
can try his case perfectly and still lose. Since any charge of
prejudicial tactics brought against the plaintiff usually will be
more harmful than one brought against the defendant, it is the
duty of the plaintiff's attorney to keep the case like "Caesar's
wife," if he can.
One of the best ways to accomplish this is through a motion
in limine. For those who are not familiar with this practice, it
is a motion, heard in advance of jury selection, which asks the
court to instruct the defendant, its counsel and witnesses not to
mention certain facts unless and until permission of the court
is ftrst obtained outside the presence and hearing of the jury.,
* Of the Austin, Texas, Bar.
1 COMES Now, plaintiff in the above entitled and numbered cause, and be-
fore trial and the selection of the jury moves the Court in limine to instruct
the defendant and all its counsel as set forth below on the following
grounds:
1.
Since it is immaterial to this suit whether or not:
(a) Plaintiff had a driver's license on the occasion in question;
(b) Plaintiff was issued a ticket as a result of the collision in
question;
(c) Plaintiff has ever been convicted of the offense of driving while
intoxicated;
(d) Defendant was not issued a ticket as a result of the collision
in question;
the defendant is precluded from using any pleading, testimony, remarks,
questions or argument which might inform the jury of such facts.
2.
Were any of the above facts made known to the jury, it would be high-
ly improper and prejudicial to plaintiff, even though the Court were to sus-
tain an objection and instruct the jury not to consider such facts for any
purpose. This motion should also be granted because there is no other way
the problems mentioned can be properly handled at the trial of this cause,
and in all probability any such attempt would result in a mistrial.
WHEREFoRE, plaintiff respectfully requests the Court to instruct the de-
fendant and all its counsel not to mention, refer to, interrogate concerning,
or attempt to convey to the jury in any manner, either directly or indi-
rectly, any of the above mentioned facts, without first obtaining permission
of the Court outside the presence and hearing of the jury, and further in-
struct the defendant and all its counsel not to make any reference to the
fact that this motion has been filed and granted and to warn and caution
each and every one of their witnesses to strictly follow these same instruc-
tions.
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An examination of the case digests shows that in the
last twenty years there has been a decided increase in the
percentage of jury cases wherein complaint has been
made of prejudice suffered by reason of the misconduct of
counsel in the examination of witnesses. Much of this mis-
conduct has consisted of knowingly asking improper ques-
tions. In many cases the attorney complained of has per-
sistently pursued a wholly unjustified and prejudicial course
of interrogation, notwithstanding objections made and
sustained, clearly calling to his attention, if such a thing
could be deemed necessary, that the questions asked were
without any plausible legal foundation . . . [109 A. L. R. at
1089.]
That was written in 1937. Since then the need for motions
in limine has steadily increased.2
Besides the clear cut situations referred to in the above
quotation, many times there is a legitimate difference of opinion
between "logical relevancy" and "legal relevancy," which can-
not be resolved without the court's ruling.
If prejudicial matters are brought before the jury, no amount
of objection or instruction can remove the harmful effect, and
the plaintiff is powerless unless he wants to forego his chance
of a trial and ask for a mistrial. Once the question is asked the
harm is done. Under the harmless error rule many of these
matters would probably not be reversible error even though they
have a subtle but devastating effect upon the plaintiff's case.
Perhaps the greatest single advantage to a motion in limine
is not having to object in the jury's presence to evidence which
is "logically relevant." Jurors cannot be expected to understand
why they should not be allowed to consider all evidence which
is related to the case, and will usually resent the fact that an
objection kept them from hearing it.
Another advantage in the use of these motions is to allow
the trial judge an opportunity to study the question and the
authorities involved. If presented in advance of trial with a
brief and with time to study it, the court will be more inclined
to grant the motion.
One of the best arguments for use of a motion in limine is
that the granting of the motion as worded above cannot be re-
2 Condra Funeral Home v. Rollin, 158 Tex. 478, 314 S. W. 2d 277 (1958);
Burdick v. York Oil Co., 364 S. W. 2d 766 (Tex. Civ. App., 1963).
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versible error.3 It is only when the evidence is offered out of
the presence of the jury and then excluded that possible rever-
sible error occurs. The appeal is taken from the rejection of
the evidence tendered, not the granting of the motion. This
rule is no different than the rule concerning other evidence ques-
tions; that is, in order for a complaint to be made upon appeal,
the excluded evidence must be in the record so the appellate
court will know what it was and be in a position to determine
the effect of its exclusion.
The power of the trial court to grant such a motion is in-
herent in its right to admit or exclude evidence and will prob-
ably not be specifically mentioned in the procedural rules. The
in limine practice is rapidly growing in Texas4 and has been at
least suggested elsewhere.5
Examples of the type of evidence that can be excluded by a
motion in limine are limited only by the particular facts of each
case and by counsel's ingenuity. Some of the more common and
obvious situations where the motion could be used fall within
the "collateral source rule," 6 such as medical expenses,7 sick
3 Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. McCardell, 6 Sup. Ct. J. 549, 369
S. W. 2d 331 (Tex. 1963); Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Finney, 346
S. W. 2d 917 (Tex. Civ. App., 1961); Alamo Express, Inc. v. Wafer, 333
S. W. 2d 651 (Tex. Civ. App., 1960).
4 Bridges v. City of Richardson, 163 Tex. 292, 354 S. W. 2d 366 (1962);
Kromzer, Advantages to be Gained by Trial Motions for the Plaintiff, 6 So.
Tex. L. J. 179 (1962).
5 Crawford v. Hite, 176 Va. 69, 10 S. E. 2d 561 (1940), Cook v. Phila. Trans.
Co., 414 Pa. 154, 199 A. 2d 446 (1964); Liska v. Merit Dress Delivery, Inc.,
250 N. Y. S. 691 (Sup. Ct., 1964); 94 A. L. R. 2d 1087.
6 O'Connor, The Collateral Source Rule and Full Special Damages, Trial
and Tort Trends (1957), at p. 642; 22 NACCA L. J. 159 (1957); 46 Minn.
L. R. 669 (1962); 95 A. L. R. 575 (1935); 18 A. L. R. 2d 659; 3 Matthew Ben-
der, Personal Injury Newsletter, at p. 218 (1959).
7 Paid by insurance:
Chapman v. Evans, 186 S. W. 2d 827 (Tex. Civ. App., 1945);
Graves v. Poe, 118 S. W. 2d 969 (Tex. Civ. App., 1938);
American Cooperage Company v. Clemons, 364 S. W. 2d 705 (Tex. Civ.
App., 1963); annot., 13 A. L. R. 2d 355 (1950).
Furnished without charge:
(a) VA Hospital-City of Ft. Worth v. Barlow, 313 S. W. 2d 906 (Tex.
Civ. App., 1958); 22 NACCA L. J. 163 (1957).
(b) Servicemen-Annot., 68 A. L. R. 2d 876 (1959); 20 NACCA L. J.
193 (1955); Bell v. Primeau, 104 N. H. 227, 183 A. 2d 729 (1962); 3 Mat-
thew Bender, Personal Injury Newsletter, at p. 225 (1959).
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leave and vacation time,s social security and pensions,9 and
withholding from salary.10 By excluding mention of these
matters, you not only add to the amount of damages which the
jury will award, but you will also prevent yourself from getting
in the prejudicial position of having asked the jury to award
damages that you have not "actually lost."
Slight materiality on other issues should not make any of
the above matters admissible as the prejudicial effect far out-
weighs any legal relevancy the evidence might have, 1' nor should
8 Sick leave paid for by insurance-Texas Cent. Ry. Co. v. Cameron, 149
S. W. 709 (Tex. Civ. App., 1912).
Sick leave paid for by employer:
(a) Voluntarily-Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Jarrard, 65 Tex. 560 (1886);
Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. Johansen, 107 Tex. 336, 179 S. W.
853 (1915); McCullough Box & Crate Co. v. Liles, 162 S. W. 2d 1055
(Tex. Civ. App., 1942); 21 NACCA L. J. 125 (1956); Beaty v. Buckeye
Fabric Finishing Co., 179 F. Supp. 688 (E. D. Ark. W. D. 1959).
(b) Credited against sick leave or vacation-Mikell v. LaBeth, 344 S.
W. 2d 702 (Tex. Civ. App., 1961); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Utz, 299 Ky.
765, 187 S. W. 2d 439 (1945); Calci v. Brown, 186 A. 2d 234 (R. I., 1962);
annot., 52 A. L. R. 2d 1451 (1957).
(c) Serviceman-Bell v. Primeau, supra note 7.
Sick leave paid for by partnership-Dumas Milner Chevrolet Co. v.
Morphis, 337 S. W. 2d 185 (Tex. Civ. App., 1960).
9 During disability period only-Texas Cities Gas Co. v. Dickens, 156 S. W.
2d 1010 (Tex. Civ. App., 1941), affd. 140 Tex. 433, 168 S. W. 2d 208 (1943).
After employment ceases-
(a) Railroad retirement fund-Mosby v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co., 191 S. W.
2d 55 (Tex. Civ. App., 1945); Missouri-Pacific R. R. Co. v. Willingham,
348 S. W. 2d 764 (Tex. Civ. App., 1961); New York, New Haven & Hart-
ford Ry. Co. v. Leary, 204 F. 2d 461 (1st Cir., 1953).
(b) Social Security, pensions and governmental payments-A. H. Bull
Steamship Co. v. Ligon, 285 F. 2d 936 (5th Cir., 1960); Price v. United
States, 179 F. Supp. 309 (E. D. Va. 1959); Healy v. Rennert, 9 N. Y. 2d
202, 173 N. E. 2d 777 (1961); Labick v. Vicker, 186 A. 2d 874 (Pa. 1962);
City of Pueblo v. Ratliff, 327 P. 2d 270 (Colo. 1958); annot. 75 A. L. R.
2d 885 (1961).
10 Mo.-Kansas-Texas R. R. Co. v. McFerrin, 156 Tex. 69, 291 S. W. 2d 931
(1956); Buckner & Sons v. Allen, 289 S. W. 2d 387 (Tex. Civ. App., 1956);
annot. 63 A. L. R. 2d 1393 (1959); Kainer v. Walker, 377 S. W. 2d 613 (Sup.
Ct. Tex., 1964); Dixie Feed & Seed Co. v. Byrd, 52 Tenn. App. 619, 376 S. W.
2d 745 (1936); Moyer v. Merrick, 392 P. 2d 653 (Colo. 1964).
11 On length of disability-Dumas Milner Chevrolet Co. v. Morphis, supra
note 8; A. H. Bull Steamship Co. v. Ligon, supra note 9; Louisville & No. Ry.
Co. v. Utz, supra note 8; Dibert v. Ross Pattern & Foundry Development Co.,
152 N. E. 2d 369 (Ohio App., 1957); Calci v. Brown, supra note 8; Clark v.
Piecillo, 75 N. J. Super. 123, 182 A. 2d 381 (1962).
On manner in which injury occurred-Green v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co.,
125 Tex. 168, 81 S. W. 2d 669 (1935). Eichel v. N. Y. Central R. R., 375 U. S.
253; 84 Sup. Ct. 316, 11 L. Ed. 2d 307, reversing 319 F. 2d 12 (2d Cir., 1963);
Traders and Gen. Ins. Co. v. Reed, 376 S. W. 2d 591 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
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such evidence be introduced for impeachment purposes since it
is on a collateral matter. 12
In death actions a motion should exclude the remarriage or
engagement of the surviving spouse as well as the surviving
spouse's income from employment, 13 life insurance, social se-
curity, pensions, Veterans Administration pensions, or other
matters which would fall under the "collateral source rule." 14
The exclusion of remarriage or engagement of the surviving
spouse should also prohibit the defendant's counsel from arguing
to the jury in summation that "this nice looking, little girl cer-
tainly isn't going to have any trouble finding someone to take
care of her."
The personal habits of the plaintiff or the decedent may also
be excluded. For example, unless there is direct proof that the
decedent or injured plaintiff was intoxicated at the time of the
injury, his drinking habits are inadmissible. 15
Only certain criminal convictions are admissible, usually
those involving moral turpitude.1" A check of the cases in your
jurisdiction will disclose that there are many crimes that have
been held not to involve moral turpitude. Of course, indict-
ments and charges are never admissible, nor is the fact that your
client received a traffic ticket in connection with the collision, or
that the opposite party did not receive a traffic ticket. 17
12 Can't impeach on a collateral matter-3 Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 1001-
1003 (3rd ed. 1940); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n. v. Yother, 306 S. W. 2d
730 (Tex. Civ. App., n. r. e., 1957); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n. v. Garza,
308 S. W. 2d 521 (Tex. Civ. App., 1957).
13 Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Younger, 90 Tex. 387, 38 S. W. 1121 (1897);
Texas Elec. Ry. v. Stewart, 217 S. W. 1081 (Tex. Civ. App., 1920); The City
of Rome, In re Ocean S. S. Co. of Savannah, 48 F. 2d 333 (S. D. N. Y. 1930);
24 NACCA L. J. 229 (1959); annot. 30 A. L. R. 121 (1924).
11 Texas & N. 0. Ry. Co. v. Tiner, 262 S. W. 2d 769 (Tex. Civ. App., 1953);
Welch v. Ada Oil Co., 302 S. W. 2d 175 (Tex. Civ. App., 1957); Lipscomb v.
Houston & T. C. Ry. Co., 95 Tex. 5, 64 S. W. 923 (1901); Lehr v. City of New
York, 219 N. Y. S. 2d 308 (1961); 25 NACCA L. J. 345 (1960); annot. 84 A. L.
R. 2d 764 (1962).
15 McCarty v. Gappelberg, 273 S. W. 2d 943 (Tex. Civ. App., 1954); Miller v.
Chicago Transit Authority, 3 Ill. App. 2d 223; 121 N. E. 2d 348 (1954); Doyle
v. City of New York, 281 App. Div. 821, 119 N. Y. S. 2d 71 (1953); Sanders
v. George, 258 N. C. 776, 129 S. E. 2d 480 (1963).
16 Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n. v. Yother, supra note 12; Texas Employers'
Ins. Ass'n. v. Garza, supra note 12; annot. 20 A. L. R. 2d 1421 (1951).
17 Condra Funeral Home v. Rollin, 158 Tex. 478, 314 S. W. 2d 277 (1958);
Allen v. Ellis, 191 Kan. 311, 380 P. 2d 408 (1963); 3 Matthew Bender, Personal
Injury Newsletter (15), 141 (Oct. 10, 1960), and Vol. 6, No. 6, p. 44 (June 3,
1963); 28 Fordham L. R. 369 (1959); 25 Ins. Counsel J. 480 (Oct. 1948); 38
Tex. L. R. 336; Garland v. Standard Oil Co., 119 Ohio App. 291, 196 N. E.
2d 810 (1963).
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Prior claims, prior suits and prior settlements are likewise
inadmissible.' s While the defendant, by pleading aggravation,
may go into the details of the extent of the injury, the manner in
which the injury occurred, whether by automobile accident or
falling off of the front steps of the home, would be immaterial, as
would the fact that a lawsuit was filed, a claim or a settlement
was made, or the amount of the settlement. None of these
matters have any relation to the extent of the injury, but can
be very prejudicial to the plaintiff.
The opinions of investigating officers are not always ad-
missible. 19 Most investigating officers are usually firm in their
opinions, which carry a lot of weight, and the effect of their
opinions can be decisive. A check of the cases in your jurisdic-
tion will determine what opinions are not admissible. For in-
stance, it has been held in Texas that a police officer may not
give an opinion concerning the speed of a vehicle based upon
the damage done to the vehicles.20
Many police departments have a space in their official re-
port form for the officer to estimate the damage to the vehicles.
Often this is a very low and conservative estimate since it is
usually for statistical purposes only. If this estimate is brought
out by the defendant, it can be very prejudicial when you are
asking for three or four times more than the police officer esti-
mated. Nearly all police officers, if asked, will admit that they
are not qualified damage appraisers and are not qualified to
give an opinion as to the value of the damage. However, unless
the defendant is instructed in advance not to ask this question
or bring out this information, once it is in its effect cannot be
removed.
When, where and how the plaintiff engaged his attorney
is also inadmissible and can be prejudicial. The fact that he went
straight from the accident to an attorney is not material on any
18 St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company v. Murphree, 163 Tex. 534,
357 S. W. 2d 744 (1962); Burger v. Van Severen, 188 N. E. 2d 373 (M11. App.,
1963).
19 Flores v. Barlow, 354 S. W. 2d 173 (Tex. Civ. App., 1962); Chronister v.
City of San Antonio, 337 S. W. 2d 223 (Tex. Civ. App., 1960); Figueroa v.
Treece, 337 S. W. 2d 400 (Tex. Civ. App., 1960); Flores v. Missouri-Kansas-
Texas Railroad Company, 365 S. W. 2d 379 (Tex. Civ. App., 1963); Morlan v.
Smith, 380 P. 2d 312 (Kan. 1963); annot. 38 A. L. R. 2d 13 (1954); annot. 66
A. L. R. 2d 1048 (1959); annot. 69 A. L. R. 2d 1148 (1960).
20 Flores v. Barlow, supra note 19; City of Austin v. Hoffman, 379 S. W. 2d
103 (Tex. Civ. App., 1964).
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issue the jury will decide. Its only purpose would be to show
that the plaintiff was litigious or "claim-minded," which in
most jurisdictions is not a legitimate area of proof. 21 However,
unless ruled out, these prejudicial matters may be brought in by
the defendant.
It would also be to the plaintiff's advantage to prohibit the
defendant's attorney from proving that the corporate defendant
is a "one-man," or "family" corporation or even a local cor-
poration. Since the plaintiff cannot prove the wealth of the de-
fendant, likewise, the defendant cannot prove its "poverty." 22
The effect of this prejudicial proof is obvious and the defendant
should be instructed in advance not to tender such proof.
In third party negligence cases it is not proper to show
that the plaintiff was covered by or received workmen's com-
pensation benefits. 23 Likewise, in a Jones Act case it is inadmis-
sible to show that the plaintiff accepted payments under the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.
24
Another way in which motions in advance of trial are useful
is in the situation where "good old" Joe, who has a wife, thir-
teen kids and a dependent, sick, widowed mother, injures your
plaintiff while in the course of his employment for Big Dog Cor-
poration. Oftentimes your suit will be against Big Dog Corpora-
tion alone and would not include "good old" Joe as a defendant.
Under these circumstances the insurance company is very likely
to bring in "good old" Joe as a third party defendant so that the
jury will believe that any judgment they enter will be against
"good old" Joe and that he will be the one that will ultimately
have to pay it.
Under these circumstances a motion to sever should be
made upon the following grounds: The joinder is prejudicial to
plaintiff25 and a third party defendant should not be brought in
unless the defendant has a cause of action against him. Now, in
21 Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Tex. 320, 127 S. W. 539 (1910);
Martinez v. Williams, 312 S. W. 2d 742 (Tex. Civ. App., 1958); Southern
Truck Leasing Corp. v. Manieri, 325 S. W. 2d 912 (Tex. Civ. App., 1959).
22 Wilmoth v. Limestone Products Co., 255 S. W. 2d 532 (Tex. Civ. App.,
1953); annot. 122 A. L. R. 1408 (1939).
23 Myers v. Thomas, 143 Tex. 502, 186 S. W. 2d 811 (1945); annot. 77 A. L. R.
2d 1158 (1961).
24 Tipton v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., Inc., 315 F. 2d 660 (5th Cir., 1963).
25 Goodhart v. U. S. Lines Co., 26 F. R. D. 163 (S. D., N. Y. 1960); Manley
v. Standard Oil Co. of Texas, 8 F. R. D. 354 (E. D. Tex., 1948); Bridges v.
Wyandotte Worsted Co., 239 S. C. 37, 121 S. E. 2d 300 (1961).
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our hypothetical case since Joe is in the course of his employ-
ment, he was obviously driving with permission and under the
standard omnibus clause of the insurance policy is also an
insured under the same policy that is protecting Big Dog Cor-
poration. Since Big Dog Corporation is insured, it will not itself
have to pay the judgment and consequently can sustain no loss,
and therefore has no cause of action against Joe. Of course, the
insurance company that is defending has no cause of action
against Joe since he is its own insured.
26
This motion to sever also has an additional advantage in
that it makes Big Dog Corporation's liability policy material
and, therefore, discoverable in that this information, as well as
the limits, is necessary to establish the fact that Big Dog has no
cause of action against "good old" Joe.
Even in those circumstances where you want Joe as a de-
fendant, the cross-action by the employer should be "motioned
out." The liability of the employee to the employer is a legal
question and is a matter with which the jury is not legitimately
concerned. Therefore, it is immaterial to the jury whether or
not the employer has cross-acted over against the employee. Its
only effect can be to prejudice the plaintiff's case and a motion
should be granted instructing the employer not to read its plead-
ing on the cross-action to the jury or to allow the jury to know
that the employer is seeking a judgment over against the em-
ployee.
Another common situation in which similar motions can be
very useful is in a suit for injuries to a minor. In such a suit
the manner in which the minor rode or drove his vehicle prior
to the collision, 27 or whether he was unlicensed, would not be
material in the suit against the minor.28 However, the defend-
ant will often claim as a defense to the parents' suit for medi-
cal expenses and the damages which they have sustained by
reason of the minor's injury that the parents were negligent in
allowing the minor to drive or ride a bicycle, motor scooter or
automobile, because they either knew or should have known
that he was a careless, unlicensed, reckless driver. Even though
26 Buckholz v. Michigan Motor Freight Lines, 19 F. R. D. 407 (E. D. Mich.,
1956).
27 Mrs. Baird's Bakeries, Inc. v. Roberts, 360 S. W. 2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.,
1962); annot. Gahring v. Barron, 133 S. E. 2d 403 (Ga. App. 1963).
28 Annot. 29 A. L. R. 2d 963 (1953).
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the court would instruct the jury that such evidence was not to
be considered insofar as the minor's case is concerned, the
prejudicial effect could not be removed.
However, such an allegation is immaterial to the final de-
termination of the lawsuit and should be "motioned out." Even
assuming that the parents were negligent, even negligent per se,
in allowing the minor to ride or drive a vehicle, nevertheless, as
a matter of law their negligence is not a proximate cause of the
collision unless the minor was negligent in some specific man-
ner at the time of the collision. This law has been established
under the negligent entrustment cases where recovery has been
attempted against the employer or owner of the car for entrust-
ing it to an unlicensed, careless or reckless driver. In those
situations the courts have usually held that the negligent en-
trustment cannot be a proximate cause as a matter of law unless
the driver was negligent at the time of the collision.2 9
In our parent-child situation, since the negligence of the
child is a complete bar to the parents' recovery, the parents' neg-
ligence in entrusting the vehicle to the child could never be
material to the outcome of the case. In other words, their neg-
ligence could not be a proximate cause unless the child was neg-
ligent at the time of the collision, and if the child was negligent
at the time of the collision, the parents could not recover any-
way.
In analogous situations,3" plaintiffs have alleged that the
employer was negligent in allowing the employee to drive its
vehicle because he was a careless, reckless, dangerous driver, in
the hope of proving the employee's bad driving record at the
time of trial. However, in these cases the employer stipulated
that at the time of the collision the employee was in the course
of his employment and therefore it was responsible for his neg-
ligence. The employer therefore argued that since their negli-
gent entrustment could not be a proximate cause of the collision
unless the employee was negligent, and since they were liable
29 Mundy v. Pirie-Slaughter Motor Co., 146 Tex. 314, 206 S. W. 2d 587 (1947);
Spratling v. Butler, 150 Tex. 369, 240 S. W. 2d 1016 (1951); McIntire v. Sellers,
311 S. W. 2d 886 (Tex. Civ. App., 1958); Carter v. Montgomery, 226 Ark. 989,
296 S. W. 2d 442 (1956); annot. 69 A. L. R. 2d 978 (1960).
30 Ferris v. Stableford, 248 S. W. 2d 186 (Tex. Civ. App., 1952); Luvual v.
Henke & Pillot, Div. of Kroger Co., 366 S. W. 2d 831 (Tex. Civ. App., 1963);
City of Austin v. Hoffman, supra note 20; City of Houston v. Watson, 376
S. W. 2d 23 (Tex. Civ. App., 1964).
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anyway if he was negligent, their negligent entrustment was
not material to the case and such allegations and proof was
therefore excluded. This same reasoning can be used in the
parent-child case to exclude all evidence concerning the prior
propensities of the child.
There are many other uses that could be made of motions
in limine and similar motions in advance of trial. Each case
will be different. It is hoped that these random examples have
stimulated your thinking and given you some idea of the ad-
vantages that can be gained from the use of such motions.
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